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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order suppressing test results of 
a blood draw obtained from Kyle Rios following Rios' arrest for vehicular 
manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In December 2013, Rios was involved in a two-vehicle accident which 
resulted in the death of the driver of the other vehicle. (R., pp.24, 26.) Rios' 
vehicle, which was traveling at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit, 
crashed into the side of the other vehicle whose driver was attempting to turn 
onto E. Main Street in Lewiston. (Id.; Prelim. Tr., p.128, L.2 - p.130, L.4.) Rios 
left the area on foot after individuals at the scene assisted him out of his vehicle. 
(R., pp.24, 26.) 
Officer Elijah Williams arrived at the scene and located Rios nearby. (R., 
p.26.) Officer Williams noted that Rios smelled of alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, 
and slurred his speech. (Id.) Officer Williams spoke with Rios and then detained 
him in handcuffs in the back of his patrol vehicle. (Id.) Rios made various 
statements to Officer Williams on the street following the accident, and in 
Williams' patrol vehicle after Rios was placed in handcuffs. (R., pp.26, 28-29.) 
After an eyewitness confirmed Rios' identity as the driver of the vehicle 
involved in the accident, Rios was transported to an area hospital for medical 
evaluation. (Id.) There, Officer Williams read the ALS advisory form to Rios and 
presented him a blood draw consent form. (R., pp.28-29.) Rios refused to sign 
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the form. (R., p.29.) Officer Williams then directed hospital staff to conduct a 
blood draw. (R, pp.28-29; SH Tr., p.36, Ls.16-18.) No search warrant was 
obtained. (SH Tr., p.35, Ls.22-24.) Rios was cooperative with the phlebotomist 
who drew his blood, and "presented" his arm to the phlebotomist to facilitate the 
process. (SH Tr., p.38, L.15 - p.39, L.2; p.48, L.22 - p.49, L.8.) Testing on the 
blood subsequently revealed a BAG of .262. (State's Exhibit B; Prelim Tr., p.60, 
L.14 - p.63, L.1.) After the blood draw was conducted, Officer Williams read Rios 
his Miranda rights, and Rios admitted that he was driving under the influence at 
the time of the accident. (R., pp.29, 31.) The state charged Rios with felony 
vehicular manslaughter and felony leaving the scene of an accident. (R., pp.125-
126.) 
Rios filed a motion to suppress test results of the blood draw, and 
statements he made to Officer Williams near the scene of the accident, in the 
patrol vehicle, and at the hospital. (R., pp.147-148, 181-182, 244-252, 327-343, 
385-405.) Rios submitted the transcript of the preliminary hearing in support of 
his motion. (R., pp.181-223.) Rios argued that admission of his statements 
made to Officer Williams would violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and 
that the warrantless blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. (R., pp.147-148, 181-182, 244-252, 
327-343, 385-405.) 
After a hearing, the district court granted Rios' motion to suppress in part. 
The court suppressed the test results of the blood draw and concluded that Rios' 
refusal to sign the consent form constituted a revocation of his implied consent 
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for evidentiary testing. 1 (R., pp.416-423; see generally SH Tr.) The district court 
also suppressed "any statements made in response to questioning between the 
time Defendant Rios was handcuffed and placed in the officer's patrol vehicle 
and when he finally received his Miranda warnings."2 (R., pp.423-425.) The 
state timely appealed. (R., pp.433-436.) 
1 The district court also rejected the state's arguments that I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) 
and/or the exigency exception to the warrant requirement justified the 
warrantless blood draw. (R., pp.419-423.) The state does not challenge this 
determination on appeal. 
2 The state does not challenge this determination on appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in granting Rios' motion to suppress test results of 
the blood draw obtained following Rios' arrest for vehicular manslaughter and 
leaving the scene of an accident? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Granting Rios' Motion To Suppress Test Results Of 
The Blood Draw Obtained Following Rios' Arrest For Vehicular Manslaughter And 
Leaving The Scene Of An Accident 
A Introduction 
The district court suppressed evidence obtained as a result of a 
warrantless blood draw. However, the district court's legal analysis was flawed 
because rather than adequately considering the totality of circumstances, the 
district court erroneously concluded that Rios' refusal to sign an evidentiary 
testing consent form constituted a per se revocation of his implied consent to 
submit to evidentiary testing. The district court therefore erred in granting Rios' 
motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
C. The District Court Erred In Granting Rios' Motion To Suppress The Test 
Results From the Blood Draw 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. Requiring that a person submit to a blood alcohol test is a 
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search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 767 (1966). "[S)earches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
Consent is a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). Implied 
consent is statutorily provided for by Idaho Code§ 18-8002(1 ), which provides: 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to 
evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 
18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given his consent to evidentiary 
testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances, 
provided that such testing is administered at the request of a peace 
officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, 
Idaho Code. 
In Missouri v. McNeely, _ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2014), a case 
specifically addressing application of the exigency exception to the warrant 
requirement in DUI-related traffic stops, the United States Supreme Court held 
that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per 
se exigent circumstance justifying a blood test without a warrant in all DWI cases. 
Following the McNeely decision, the Idaho Supreme Court revisited its 
implied consent precedent. Recognizing that, because Idaho case law at the 
time did not allow a driver to revoke his implied consent, "Idaho ha[d] a per se 
exception to the warrant requirement" contrary to the Supreme Court's holding. 
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State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 423, 337 P.3d 575, 582 (2014). The Idaho 
Supreme Court therefore overruled its prior decisions "to the extent that they 
applied Idaho's implied consent statute as an irrevocable per se rule that 
constitutionally allowed forced warrantless blood draws." kl 
The Court did not, however, rule that statutorily implied consent was 
invalid; rather, it determined that implied consent was revocable. Following the 
Wulff decision, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that "[i)nherent in the 
requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that 
consent." State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014). The 
Court reinforced that holding in a subsequent case, explaining that "a suspect 
can withdraw his or her statutorily implied consent to a test for the presence of 
alcohol." State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, 774, 339 P.3d 1177, 1178 (2014). 
Under Idaho case law, as now clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court, a 
driver's implied consent is valid so long as it is voluntary. For implied consent to 
be voluntary, drivers must (1) give their initial consent voluntarily and (2) continue 
to give voluntary consent. Wulff, 157 Idaho at 423, 337 P.3d at 582. "Drivers in 
Idaho give their initial consent to evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads 
voluntarily." kl (citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 
(2007)). The driver's consent continues to be voluntary until he or she withdraws 
that consent by rejecting or resisting the evidentiary testing. Halseth, 157 Idaho 
at 646, 339 P.3d at 371. Therefore, if a suspect does not affirmatively reject or 
resist the evidentiary testing authorized by I.C. § 18-8002(1 ), then the consent 
exception remains valid and no warrant is required. See id. 
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Further, while "[i]t is the state's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result of duress or 
coercion, direct or implied," State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 685, 263 P.3d 
145, 150 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted), a driver gives his consent to 
evidentiary testing by driving on Idaho roads, see Arrotta, supra; Halseth, supra; 
Wulff, supra. The state therefore asserts that is the burden of the DUI suspect 
seeking to suppress test results of a blood draw to present evidence that he or 
she subsequently revoked that implied consent. Otherwise, it would be the 
state's burden to prove a negative, i.e., that the motorist did not withdraw his 
consent or refuse the blood test. Ultimately, "[w]hether a warrantless blood test 
of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based 
on the totality of the circumstances." McNeely, _, U.S. at _, 133 S.Ct. at 
1563. 
In this case, the district court expressly noted that at the suppression 
hearing, "[t]he phlebotomist testified Rios was not restrained during the process, 
was cooperative and compliant, and presented his arm to her for the taking of 
blood." (R., p.418.) Further, the court found that there was "no evidence Rios at 
any time verbally or physically resisted having his blood drawn." (R., p.419.) 
However, despite Rios' cooperation with the blood draw and his lack of verbal 
objection or physical resistance, the district court still concluded that Rios 
withdrew his implied consent. (Id.) Despite labeling its analysis as one 
considering the totality of circumstances, the court based its conclusion entirely 
on Rios' refusal to sign the consent form: 
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Rios' s refusal to sign the consent form not only evidences a lack of 
voluntary consent, but it can reasonably be construed as a with-
drawal of implied consent. See State v. Arrotta, 2014 WL 7185353 
(refusal to perform breath test was withdrawal of implied consent). 
The Court recognizes that such a presumption is at odds with 
Rios's physical compliance with the process. However, in light of 
the McNeely and Wulff rulings that per se exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are unconstitutional, and because the Court does not 
believe the current state of the law requires a driver to physically 
resist a blood draw (nor should it), the Court finds it must err on the 
side of the Defendant and find that Rios, by refusing to sign the 
consent form, withdrew his implied consent and at no time volun-
tarily consented. 
(R., p.419 (emphasis added).) 
Thus, by employing a presumption that Rios withdrew his implied consent 
"by refusing to sign the consent form," the district court failed to review the totality 
of the circumstances and instead adopted a per se test. This analysis was 
flawed for several reasons. First, Arrotta, the opinion relied upon by the district 
court, does not support the court's conclusion or utilization of a per se test. In 
Arrotta, the Idaho Supreme Court merely held that statutory implied consent 
could be withdrawn. Arrotta, 157 Idaho at 773-774, 339 P.3d at 1177-1178. 
Arotta does not contain any guidance regarding the issue presented in this case, 
whether a motorist's decision not to sign a consent form constitutes a per se 
revocation of his implied consent to submit to evidentiary testing. See id. 
Further, Rios failed to allege facts from which it could be established that 
his decision not to sign the consent form, even if considered as one factor in a 
totality of circumstances analysis, established on its own that Rios withdrew his 
implied consent. Rios did not present the consent form itself as evidence at 
either the preliminary hearing or the suppression hearing. Rios failed to present 
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evidence establishing why he declined to sign the form. Additionally, Rios 
presented no evidence regarding the nature of his "refusal" to sign the form -
e.g., whether Rios expressed some verbal objection to the form or to the testing 
itself, or simply stood silent when he was presented with the form. Indeed, as the 
court found, there was "no evidence Rios at any time verbally[3] or physically 
resisted having his blood drawn." (R., p.419.) As a result, Rios' mere decision 
not to sign the consent form cannot itself constitute an affirmative revocation of 
his implied consent in the circumstances of this case. 
Appellate courts in several other jurisdictions have analyzed similar issues 
in the context of administrative license suspensions. In Commonwealth v. 
Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 935 (Pa. 1995), a motorist's driver's license was 
suspended after she refused to sign a testing consent form. The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that because Pennsylvania law did not require written 
consent to submit to chemical testing, and because the motorist's consent to take 
the test was implied pursuant to Pennsylvania law, then the consent form was not 
vital to the chemical testing procedure, and a motorist's refusal to sign a consent 
form could not, on its own, establish a refusal to take a test. ~ at 938-939; see 
also Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 467 S.W.2d 338, 338-339 (Ky. App. 1971) 
(holding that officer's request that motorist sign hospital consent form was not 
equivalent to request by officer that motorist take blood test, and motorist's 
3 As noted above, the district court expressed a belief that Idaho law does not 
require a driver to "physically resist a blood draw." (R., p.419.) However, this 
belief did not compel its conclusion in this case. In addition to the lack of 
physical resistance, there was no evidence in the record that Rios even verbally 
objected to the blood draw. (Id.) Further, Rios physically facilitated the blood 
draw by "presenting" or lifting his arm. (R., p.418.) 
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refusal to sign the form was not ground for revocation of driver's license); Wofford 
v. Director of Revenue, 868 S.W.2d 142, 142-143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that motorist's refusal to sign hospital consent form did not constitute a refusal to 
submit to blood test where motorist voluntarily presented his arm to the 
technician for the purpose of drawing blood.) Similarly to the law in these 
jurisdictions, Idaho law does not require a motorist's consent to evidentiary 
testing be accompanied by a written consent form. The form thus has no 
particular legal significance, other than its evidentiary documentation of a 
defendant's consent. Therefore, the refusal to sign such a form does not 
necessarily constitute a revocation of implied consent. 
Further, Idaho appellate courts have held that in the context of written 
Miranda waivers, while a defendant's refusal to sign a rights waiver form deprives 
the state of evidence that the defendant waived his rights, it is not determinative 
of whether a waiver actually occurred. State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 132, 44 
P.3d 1180, 1187 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a defendant who was advised of his 
Miranda rights, refused to sign a waiver form, and then made incriminating 
statements to police, had effectively waived his rights); State v. Brennan, 123 
Idaho 553, 557-558, 850 P.2d 202, 206-207 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a 
Miranda does not require a written or express waiver, and therefore, defendant 
who refused to sign a written waiver of rights still waived those rights by speaking 
with detective); see also State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 558-559, 199 P.3d 123, 
133-134 (2008) (following a suspect's Miranda rights waiver, officers must 
thereafter cease interrogation only if the suspect's attempt to re-invoke his rights 
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and withdraw the waiver is "clear and unequivocal"). 
Similarly, while Rios' refusal to sign the consent form deprived the state 
of a specific piece of evidence indicating that he affirmatively consented to the 
subsequent testing, it did not, by itself, without evidence of verbal or physical 
objection to the actual testing, constitute a revocation of his implied consent. 
The district court erred in concluding that Rios' refusal to sign a consent 
form constituted a revocation of his implied consent to submit to evidentiary 
testing. The district court therefore erred by suppressing the test results of the 
blood draw. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order suppressing the test results of the blood draw and remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 5th day of October, 2015. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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